Publications
Practical Death
Forthcoming in The Journal of Moral Philosophy
This article argues that integrity requires living up to the requirements of our core commitments. I argue that an agent who violates the requirements of her core commitments and ceases to be integrated suffers a practical death: an experience characterized by psychological crisis, loss of direction, and a diminished capacity for instrumental reasoning. Because these conditions undermine self-governance, the account I offer illuminates an important but underexplored connection between integrity and self-governance.
This article argues that integrity requires living up to the requirements of our core commitments. I argue that an agent who violates the requirements of her core commitments and ceases to be integrated suffers a practical death: an experience characterized by psychological crisis, loss of direction, and a diminished capacity for instrumental reasoning. Because these conditions undermine self-governance, the account I offer illuminates an important but underexplored connection between integrity and self-governance.
Eras
Forthcoming in The Philosophy of Taylor Swift, edited by Lindsay Brainard, Ryan Davis, and Jessica Flanigan for Oxford University Press
This paper explores the role of eras – periods during which something new is currently (but not permanently) informing one's behavior or style – in practical identity formation. I argue that eras present us with opportunities to play with identity, especially before we come to have a stable self-conception, to "try on" roles, values, and projects for size as we figure out who we are. My account of eras sheds light on the possibility of experimentation in practical identity formation.
This paper explores the role of eras – periods during which something new is currently (but not permanently) informing one's behavior or style – in practical identity formation. I argue that eras present us with opportunities to play with identity, especially before we come to have a stable self-conception, to "try on" roles, values, and projects for size as we figure out who we are. My account of eras sheds light on the possibility of experimentation in practical identity formation.
Can Consent Be Irrevocable?
Philosophers' Imprint 25 (2025): 38
This article argues that consent must be revocable. I present two arguments for this conclusion. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks validity because it cannot be sufficiently informed. On the argument from bodily integrity, irrevocable consent lacks validity because we do not have the authority to deny our future selves the ability to protect our bodily integrity. I explain why the argument from bodily integrity captures unique moral problems raised by irrevocable consent and illuminates an important but undertheorized distinction between autonomy and bodily integrity.
This article argues that consent must be revocable. I present two arguments for this conclusion. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks validity because it cannot be sufficiently informed. On the argument from bodily integrity, irrevocable consent lacks validity because we do not have the authority to deny our future selves the ability to protect our bodily integrity. I explain why the argument from bodily integrity captures unique moral problems raised by irrevocable consent and illuminates an important but undertheorized distinction between autonomy and bodily integrity.
The Normative Power of Resolutions
The Monist 108, no. 1 (2025): 59-69
This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. I argue that the reasons we incur from making resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if temptation causes preference and even judgment shifts at the time of action, and offers a response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem, on which if resolutions were reason-giving they would problematically allow us to bootstrap any action into rationality simply by resolving to perform it.
This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. I argue that the reasons we incur from making resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if temptation causes preference and even judgment shifts at the time of action, and offers a response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem, on which if resolutions were reason-giving they would problematically allow us to bootstrap any action into rationality simply by resolving to perform it.
Counterfactual Reasoning in Art Criticism
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 80, no. 3(2022): 276–285
When we evaluate artworks, we often point to what an artist could have done or what a work could have been in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. On my account, counterfactual claims about artworks involve comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works. The practice of imagining what an artwork could have been is critically useful because it can help us understand how artworks achieve specific aesthetic effects. I conclude by responding to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects.
When we evaluate artworks, we often point to what an artist could have done or what a work could have been in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. On my account, counterfactual claims about artworks involve comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works. The practice of imagining what an artwork could have been is critically useful because it can help us understand how artworks achieve specific aesthetic effects. I conclude by responding to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects.