My three main research projects are outlined below.
Integrity and Temporally Extended Agency
On one popular view, integrity is a matter of having a set of commitments, roles, or desires with which you identify and that can be unified into a coherent whole. My research complicates this view of integrity by taking into account the temporally extended nature of our agency, inquiring into the integration of agency not only at a given time, but over time.
Publications
The Normative Power of Resolutions
Forthcoming in The Monist
Here is the penultimate draft.
This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. I argue that the reasons we incur from making resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if temptation causes preference and even judgment shifts at the time of action, and offers a response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem, on which if resolutions were reason-giving they would problematically allow us to bootstrap any action into rationality simply by resolving to perform it.
Here is the penultimate draft.
This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. I argue that the reasons we incur from making resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if temptation causes preference and even judgment shifts at the time of action, and offers a response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem, on which if resolutions were reason-giving they would problematically allow us to bootstrap any action into rationality simply by resolving to perform it.
Can Consent Be Irrevocable?
Forthcoming in Philosophers' Imprint
Here is the penultimate draft
This article argues that consent must be revocable. I present two arguments for this conclusion. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks validity because it cannot be sufficiently informed. On the argument from bodily integrity, irrevocable consent lacks validity because we do not have the authority to deny our future selves the ability to protect our bodily integrity. I explain why the argument from bodily integrity captures unique moral problems raised by irrevocable consent and illuminates an important but undertheorized distinction between autonomy and bodily integrity.
Here is the penultimate draft
This article argues that consent must be revocable. I present two arguments for this conclusion. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks validity because it cannot be sufficiently informed. On the argument from bodily integrity, irrevocable consent lacks validity because we do not have the authority to deny our future selves the ability to protect our bodily integrity. I explain why the argument from bodily integrity captures unique moral problems raised by irrevocable consent and illuminates an important but undertheorized distinction between autonomy and bodily integrity.
Eras
Forthcoming in The Philosophy of Taylor Swift: Magic, Madness, Heaven, Sin, edited by Lindsay Brainard, Ryan Davis, and Jessica Flanigan for Oxford University Press
Draft available upon request
This paper provides an account of eras, using selections from Swift's discography to explore the role eras – periods during which something new is currently (but not permanently) informing one's behavior or style – play in practical identity formation and challenge they pose for prevailing views of integrity. I argue that eras present us with opportunities to play with identity, especially before we come to have a stable self-conception, to "try on" roles, values, and projects for size as we figure out who we are. My account of eras sheds light on the experimental flavor practical identity formation can have.
Draft available upon request
This paper provides an account of eras, using selections from Swift's discography to explore the role eras – periods during which something new is currently (but not permanently) informing one's behavior or style – play in practical identity formation and challenge they pose for prevailing views of integrity. I argue that eras present us with opportunities to play with identity, especially before we come to have a stable self-conception, to "try on" roles, values, and projects for size as we figure out who we are. My account of eras sheds light on the experimental flavor practical identity formation can have.
In progress
Practical Death
Draft available upon request
This article argues that integrity requires living up to the requirements of our core commitments. I argue that an agent who violates the requirements of her core commitments and ceases to be integrated suffers a practical death: an experience characterized by psychological crisis, loss of direction, and a diminished capacity for instrumental reasoning. Because these conditions undermine self-governance, the account I offer illuminates an important but underexplored connection between integrity and self-governance.
This article argues that integrity requires living up to the requirements of our core commitments. I argue that an agent who violates the requirements of her core commitments and ceases to be integrated suffers a practical death: an experience characterized by psychological crisis, loss of direction, and a diminished capacity for instrumental reasoning. Because these conditions undermine self-governance, the account I offer illuminates an important but underexplored connection between integrity and self-governance.
The Ethics of Reporting Wrongdoing
Moral philosophers have a good understanding of what makes actions wrongful: wrongful actions might cause more harm than good, violate the categorical imperative, or evince a vicious character. But one neglected topic in ethics concerns the reporting of wrongful actions. When we bear witness to wrongdoing, are we morally required to report it? What if the authorities to whom the wrong should be reported are corrupt, or reporting it would cause further harm to the victim? In these papers, I address these questions through a nonideal lens, considering our duties to report wrongdoing under conditions of injustice.
In progress
Surveillance and the Role of Anti-Snitching Norms
Draft available upon request
Many groups, ranging from labor unions to student groups to the mafia, discourage or prohibit members from sharing information about the group’s activities with the authorities. In this paper, I provide an account of anti-snitching norms and the circumstances under which they are justified. I argue that snitching is helpfully understood as a form of surveillance: snitches provide the authorities with information that is used to monitor and control subordinated groups. On my view, anti-snitching norms protect the subordinated against the harmful effects of surveillance. Whether or not anti-snitching norms are justified in a given context will therefore depend on whether a group ought to be surveilled by the relevant authorities.
Many groups, ranging from labor unions to student groups to the mafia, discourage or prohibit members from sharing information about the group’s activities with the authorities. In this paper, I provide an account of anti-snitching norms and the circumstances under which they are justified. I argue that snitching is helpfully understood as a form of surveillance: snitches provide the authorities with information that is used to monitor and control subordinated groups. On my view, anti-snitching norms protect the subordinated against the harmful effects of surveillance. Whether or not anti-snitching norms are justified in a given context will therefore depend on whether a group ought to be surveilled by the relevant authorities.
Mandatory Reporting and the Politicization of Sexual Assault
This paper considers moral grounds for opposing mandatory reporting policies in higher education that require certain employees to report incidents of sexual violence to university officials. I argue that mandatory reporting policies, although well-intentioned, are part of a pattern of the politicization of sexual assault, a wrong that is experienced by victims as deeply intimate, not political. The paper grapples with the tension between the harms rape causes to women as a social group and the harms it causes to individual victims, shedding light on the unique challenges involved in finding institutional solutions to sexual violence.
Poetic Justice
This paper considers several grounds for rationalizing what appear to be morally incoherent responses to injustice – for example, how one might simultaneously believe that prisons should be abolished and that some wrongdoers should be punished within the existing carceral system. Consider how after former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin’s murder of George Floyd in 2020 led to worldwide protests against police brutality, many protestors with strong abolitionist convictions nevertheless celebrated Chauvin's prison sentencing. If prisons should be abolished, is delighting in this outcome morally acceptable? This paper argues that when delighting in unjust outcomes is understood as an aesthetic rather than a moral response, it is not incoherent. The paper concludes by evaluating the permissibility of responding to others' plights aesthetically.
Aesthetics
In addition to my primary research interests in ethics, philosophy of action, and social philosophy, I maintain an active research program in aesthetics. Currently, I am interested in the roles of emotion and attention in our appreciative practices.
Publications
Counterfactual Reasoning in Art Criticism
Published in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism in 2022
When we evaluate artworks, we often point to what an artist could have done or what a work could have been in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. On my account, counterfactual claims about artworks involve comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works. The practice of imagining what an artwork could have been is critically useful because it can help us understand how artworks achieve specific aesthetic effects. I conclude by responding to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects.
When we evaluate artworks, we often point to what an artist could have done or what a work could have been in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. On my account, counterfactual claims about artworks involve comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works. The practice of imagining what an artwork could have been is critically useful because it can help us understand how artworks achieve specific aesthetic effects. I conclude by responding to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects.
In progress
Aesthetic Costs of Being Medicated
Draft available upon request
Emotional blunting – restrictions in the range and intensity of the emotions one is able to feel – is a common side effect of antidepressants. In this paper, I argue that emotional blunting imposes an aesthetic cost on those who experience it as a side effect of antidepressants. I survey the scientific literature suggesting that depression is caused in large part by deficient emotion regulation, which is improved with antidepressants. However, these very same mechanisms hypothesized to make antidepressants effective at treating depression are also what cause emotional blunting. After explaining the crucial role of affect in aesthetic appreciation, I argue that antidepressants blunt emotional sensitivity, intensity, and rumination, which enhance one’s appreciative capacities. The view I offer sheds light on the undertheorized role of affect in aesthetic appreciation as well as the oft-posited but poorly understood connection between mental illness and creativity.
Emotional blunting – restrictions in the range and intensity of the emotions one is able to feel – is a common side effect of antidepressants. In this paper, I argue that emotional blunting imposes an aesthetic cost on those who experience it as a side effect of antidepressants. I survey the scientific literature suggesting that depression is caused in large part by deficient emotion regulation, which is improved with antidepressants. However, these very same mechanisms hypothesized to make antidepressants effective at treating depression are also what cause emotional blunting. After explaining the crucial role of affect in aesthetic appreciation, I argue that antidepressants blunt emotional sensitivity, intensity, and rumination, which enhance one’s appreciative capacities. The view I offer sheds light on the undertheorized role of affect in aesthetic appreciation as well as the oft-posited but poorly understood connection between mental illness and creativity.
Rewatching
Draft available upon request
In this paper, I challenge the “single-viewing norm” – the pervasive but poorly understood belief that the right number of times to watch a film is once – by exploring the aesthetic potential of rewatching. I argue that in addition to attuning us to a film’s subtleties and affording us deeper, more loving aesthetic experiences, rewatching movies can teach us how to pay better attention to our everyday perceptual experiences in a meaningful, reflective way.
In this paper, I challenge the “single-viewing norm” – the pervasive but poorly understood belief that the right number of times to watch a film is once – by exploring the aesthetic potential of rewatching. I argue that in addition to attuning us to a film’s subtleties and affording us deeper, more loving aesthetic experiences, rewatching movies can teach us how to pay better attention to our everyday perceptual experiences in a meaningful, reflective way.
Dissertation
I defended my dissertation, entitled "Essays on Integrated Agency," in July 2022 at the University of Michigan. The dissertation offers an account of the role of integrity in our agency. I argue that the unification of the various facets of our agency into a coherent whole is essential for our self-governance: our ability to act in ways that reflect what we stand for. When we are fragmented–when our commitments conflict, or we otherwise fail to live up to what they require of us–we experience inner conflicts that hinder our ability to be self-governing. Here is the dissertation. Note that each of the papers in the dissertation have changed substantially since my defense! I am happy to provide up-to-date versions of the papers upon request.