Publications
Can Consent Be Irrevocable?
Forthcoming in Philosophers' Imprint
Link to PhilPapers
This article argues that consent must be revocable. I present two arguments for this conclusion. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks validity because it cannot be sufficiently informed. On the argument from bodily integrity, irrevocable consent lacks validity because we do not have the authority to deny our future selves the ability to protect our bodily integrity. I explain why the argument from bodily integrity captures unique moral problems raised by irrevocable consent and illuminates an important but undertheorized distinction between autonomy and bodily integrity.
Link to PhilPapers
This article argues that consent must be revocable. I present two arguments for this conclusion. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks validity because it cannot be sufficiently informed. On the argument from bodily integrity, irrevocable consent lacks validity because we do not have the authority to deny our future selves the ability to protect our bodily integrity. I explain why the argument from bodily integrity captures unique moral problems raised by irrevocable consent and illuminates an important but undertheorized distinction between autonomy and bodily integrity.
Practical Death
Forthcoming in The Journal of Moral Philosophy
Link to PhilPapers
This article argues that integrity requires living up to the requirements of our core commitments. I argue that an agent who violates the requirements of her core commitments and ceases to be integrated suffers a practical death: an experience characterized by psychological crisis, loss of direction, and a diminished capacity for instrumental reasoning. Because these conditions undermine self-governance, the account I offer illuminates an important but underexplored connection between integrity and self-governance.
Link to PhilPapers
This article argues that integrity requires living up to the requirements of our core commitments. I argue that an agent who violates the requirements of her core commitments and ceases to be integrated suffers a practical death: an experience characterized by psychological crisis, loss of direction, and a diminished capacity for instrumental reasoning. Because these conditions undermine self-governance, the account I offer illuminates an important but underexplored connection between integrity and self-governance.
Eras
Forthcoming in The Philosophy of Taylor Swift: Magic, Madness, Heaven, Sin, edited by Lindsay Brainard, Ryan Davis, and Jessica Flanigan for Oxford University Press
Link to penultimate draft
This paper explores the role of eras – periods during which something new is currently (but not permanently) informing one's behavior or style – in practical identity formation. I argue that eras present us with opportunities to play with identity, especially before we come to have a stable self-conception, to "try on" roles, values, and projects for size as we figure out who we are. My account of eras sheds light on the possibility of experimentation in practical identity formation.
Link to penultimate draft
This paper explores the role of eras – periods during which something new is currently (but not permanently) informing one's behavior or style – in practical identity formation. I argue that eras present us with opportunities to play with identity, especially before we come to have a stable self-conception, to "try on" roles, values, and projects for size as we figure out who we are. My account of eras sheds light on the possibility of experimentation in practical identity formation.
The Normative Power of Resolutions
Published in The Monist 108 (2025)
Link to PhilPapers
This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. I argue that the reasons we incur from making resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if temptation causes preference and even judgment shifts at the time of action, and offers a response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem, on which if resolutions were reason-giving they would problematically allow us to bootstrap any action into rationality simply by resolving to perform it.
Link to PhilPapers
This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. I argue that the reasons we incur from making resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if temptation causes preference and even judgment shifts at the time of action, and offers a response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem, on which if resolutions were reason-giving they would problematically allow us to bootstrap any action into rationality simply by resolving to perform it.
Counterfactual Reasoning in Art Criticism
Published in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (2022)
Link to PhilPapers
When we evaluate artworks, we often point to what an artist could have done or what a work could have been in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. On my account, counterfactual claims about artworks involve comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works. The practice of imagining what an artwork could have been is critically useful because it can help us understand how artworks achieve specific aesthetic effects. I conclude by responding to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects.
Link to PhilPapers
When we evaluate artworks, we often point to what an artist could have done or what a work could have been in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. On my account, counterfactual claims about artworks involve comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works. The practice of imagining what an artwork could have been is critically useful because it can help us understand how artworks achieve specific aesthetic effects. I conclude by responding to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects.
Works in progress and under review
[Under review]
Draft available upon request
In this paper, I provide an account of anti-snitching norms and consider the circumstances under which they are justified. On the account I propose, snitching is a form of surveillance: snitches provide the authorities with information that enables those authorities to monitor, influence, and control subordinated groups. By signaling a subordinated group’s disdain for snitches and increasing the costs of snitching, anti -snitching norms protect members of subordinated groups against the harmful effects of surveillance. Whether or not anti -snitching norms are justified in a given contex t therefore depend s in part on whether and to what extent the context justifies surveillance.
In this paper, I provide an account of anti-snitching norms and consider the circumstances under which they are justified. On the account I propose, snitching is a form of surveillance: snitches provide the authorities with information that enables those authorities to monitor, influence, and control subordinated groups. By signaling a subordinated group’s disdain for snitches and increasing the costs of snitching, anti -snitching norms protect members of subordinated groups against the harmful effects of surveillance. Whether or not anti -snitching norms are justified in a given contex t therefore depend s in part on whether and to what extent the context justifies surveillance.
[Under review]
Draft available upon request
Emotional blunting – restrictions in the range and intensity of the emotions one is able to feel – is a common side effect of antidepressants. In this paper, I argue that emotional blunting imposes an aesthetic cost on those who experience it as a side effect of antidepressants. I survey the scientific literature suggesting that depression is caused in large part by deficient emotion regulation, which is improved with antidepressants. However, these very same mechanisms hypothesized to make antidepressants effective at treating depression are also what cause emotional blunting. After explaining the crucial role of affect in aesthetic appreciation, I argue that antidepressants blunt emotional sensitivity, intensity, and rumination, which enhance one’s appreciative capacities. The view I offer sheds light on the undertheorized role of affect in aesthetic appreciation as well as the oft-posited but poorly understood connection between mental illness and creativity.
Emotional blunting – restrictions in the range and intensity of the emotions one is able to feel – is a common side effect of antidepressants. In this paper, I argue that emotional blunting imposes an aesthetic cost on those who experience it as a side effect of antidepressants. I survey the scientific literature suggesting that depression is caused in large part by deficient emotion regulation, which is improved with antidepressants. However, these very same mechanisms hypothesized to make antidepressants effective at treating depression are also what cause emotional blunting. After explaining the crucial role of affect in aesthetic appreciation, I argue that antidepressants blunt emotional sensitivity, intensity, and rumination, which enhance one’s appreciative capacities. The view I offer sheds light on the undertheorized role of affect in aesthetic appreciation as well as the oft-posited but poorly understood connection between mental illness and creativity.
[Under review]
Draft available upon request
In this paper, I challenge the “single-viewing norm” – the pervasive but poorly understood belief that the right number of times to watch a film is once – by exploring the aesthetic potential of rewatching. I argue that in addition to attuning us to a film’s subtleties and affording us deeper, more loving aesthetic experiences, rewatching movies can teach us how to pay better attention to our everyday perceptual experiences in a meaningful, reflective way.
In this paper, I challenge the “single-viewing norm” – the pervasive but poorly understood belief that the right number of times to watch a film is once – by exploring the aesthetic potential of rewatching. I argue that in addition to attuning us to a film’s subtleties and affording us deeper, more loving aesthetic experiences, rewatching movies can teach us how to pay better attention to our everyday perceptual experiences in a meaningful, reflective way.