Publications
Counterfactual Reasoning in Art Criticism (The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 2022)
When we evaluate artworks, we often point to what an artist could have done or what a work could have been in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. On my account, counterfactual claims about artworks involve comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works. The practice of imagining what an artwork could have been is critically useful because it can help us understand how artworks achieve specific aesthetic effects. I conclude by responding to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects.
Current projects
[Title redacted for review]
Draft available upon request
This article argues that integrity requires living up to the requirements of our core commitments. I argue that an agent who violates the requirements of her core commitments and ceases to be integrated suffers a practical death: an experience characterized by psychological crisis, loss of direction, and a diminished capacity for instrumental reasoning. Because these conditions undermine self-governance, the account I offer illuminates an important but underexplored connection between integrity and self-governance.
This article argues that integrity requires living up to the requirements of our core commitments. I argue that an agent who violates the requirements of her core commitments and ceases to be integrated suffers a practical death: an experience characterized by psychological crisis, loss of direction, and a diminished capacity for instrumental reasoning. Because these conditions undermine self-governance, the account I offer illuminates an important but underexplored connection between integrity and self-governance.
[Title redacted for review]
Draft available upon request
This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs a normative reason to φ over and above the reasons that led her to resolve to φ the first place. I argue that resolutions are important because, in the face of temptation, they allow us to stick to our plans and act in ways that reflect what we are truly committed to: to be self-governing. On my view, resolution-making is a normative power: with it, agents have a remarkable ability to alter their normative circumstances through sheer acts of will. To explain the normativity of resolutions, I compare the reasons we incur from forming resolutions to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account offers a ready response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem for mental attitudes, on which if mental attitudes gave us reasons, we could bootstrap any action into rationality simply by acquiring the relevant mental attitude.
This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs a normative reason to φ over and above the reasons that led her to resolve to φ the first place. I argue that resolutions are important because, in the face of temptation, they allow us to stick to our plans and act in ways that reflect what we are truly committed to: to be self-governing. On my view, resolution-making is a normative power: with it, agents have a remarkable ability to alter their normative circumstances through sheer acts of will. To explain the normativity of resolutions, I compare the reasons we incur from forming resolutions to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account offers a ready response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem for mental attitudes, on which if mental attitudes gave us reasons, we could bootstrap any action into rationality simply by acquiring the relevant mental attitude.
[Title redacted for review]
Draft available upon request
Morally valid consent is consent that succeeds in generating a moral permission. Some widely accepted conditions for morally valid consent include that it be informed and that it be uncoerced. In this article, I argue that morally valid consent must also be revocable. I propose two arguments against irrevocability. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks morally validity because it cannot be sufficiently informed. On the argument from bodily integrity, irrevocable consent lacks morally validity because we do not have the authority to deny our future selves the ability to protect our bodily integrity. I explain why the argument from bodily integrity captures unique problems raised by irrevocable consent and illuminates an undertheorized distinction between autonomy and bodily integrity.
Morally valid consent is consent that succeeds in generating a moral permission. Some widely accepted conditions for morally valid consent include that it be informed and that it be uncoerced. In this article, I argue that morally valid consent must also be revocable. I propose two arguments against irrevocability. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks morally validity because it cannot be sufficiently informed. On the argument from bodily integrity, irrevocable consent lacks morally validity because we do not have the authority to deny our future selves the ability to protect our bodily integrity. I explain why the argument from bodily integrity captures unique problems raised by irrevocable consent and illuminates an undertheorized distinction between autonomy and bodily integrity.
Starting Over
Draft available upon request
After a period of depression or personal turmoil, people sometimes express a desire for a "fresh start" or "clean slate." People suffering from internal conflict suddenly cast aside their commitments, sever ties with people they know, and go on adventures around the world. This paper uses the phenomenon of "starting over" as a basis for exploring the power we have to change the commitments that make us who we are through a process that I call practical restructuring. Because starting over is a particularly effective way of resolving inner conflicts through practical restructuring, agents in the grip of internal conflict often desire to start over.
After a period of depression or personal turmoil, people sometimes express a desire for a "fresh start" or "clean slate." People suffering from internal conflict suddenly cast aside their commitments, sever ties with people they know, and go on adventures around the world. This paper uses the phenomenon of "starting over" as a basis for exploring the power we have to change the commitments that make us who we are through a process that I call practical restructuring. Because starting over is a particularly effective way of resolving inner conflicts through practical restructuring, agents in the grip of internal conflict often desire to start over.
Snitching
Draft available upon request
This paper provides an account of the wrongfulness of snitching. On my account, a snitch is someone who reports to societally sanctioned authorities activities that go on in communities where mainstream moral norms are suspended. I call these communities moral subcultures. Moral subcultures are important; among other things, they are essential to moral progress. We have good reason to want many moral subcultures to exist with a high degree of autonomy, and insofar as snitching threatens the autonomy of these moral subcultures, snitching is wrong. However, the wrongfulness of snitching poses genuine normative conflicts. Justice sometimes requires that wrongdoing be reported to authorities. This makes it seem as though one cannot consistently care about justice and believe that snitching is wrong. I conclude by discussing some relevant considerations for addressing these conflicts.
This paper provides an account of the wrongfulness of snitching. On my account, a snitch is someone who reports to societally sanctioned authorities activities that go on in communities where mainstream moral norms are suspended. I call these communities moral subcultures. Moral subcultures are important; among other things, they are essential to moral progress. We have good reason to want many moral subcultures to exist with a high degree of autonomy, and insofar as snitching threatens the autonomy of these moral subcultures, snitching is wrong. However, the wrongfulness of snitching poses genuine normative conflicts. Justice sometimes requires that wrongdoing be reported to authorities. This makes it seem as though one cannot consistently care about justice and believe that snitching is wrong. I conclude by discussing some relevant considerations for addressing these conflicts.
Early stages
Here are various projects I am working on but do not have drafts available to circulate. However, I would love to discuss them with anyone who is interested!
- Respect for Elders: a paper that considers whether there is an obligation to respect one's elders, drawing on insights from Chinese and African philosophy.
- Safe Love: a paper that defends a safety condition on love, such that a person loves someone only if she could not have easily not loved them.
- What Is an Art Manifesto?: a paper that provides an account of art manifestos and their value.
- The Unthinkable and the Unwillable: a paper that explores the implications of the distinction between actions that are unthinkable and actions that are unwillable.
- On Being Inconsolable: a paper that provides an account of what makes something a consolation, and why we sometimes find ourselves to be inconsolable.
Dissertation
I defended my dissertation, entitled "Essays on Integrated Agency," in July 2022 at the University of Michigan. The dissertation offers an account of the role of integrity in our agency. I argue that the unification of the various facets of our agency into a coherent whole is essential for our self-governance: our ability to act in ways that reflect what we stand for. When we are fragmented–when our commitments conflict, or we otherwise fail to live up to what they require of us–we experience inner conflicts that hinder our ability to be self-governing. Here is the dissertation (but note that each of the papers in the dissertation have changed substantially since my defense! I am happy to provide up-to-date versions of the papers upon request).
Public Writing
Here are a few short pieces for general audiences.
- Here is a post I wrote for the Daily Noûs on behalf of MAP International about graduate student service work recognition in 2020.
- Here is a contribution I made to an Aesthetics for Birds roundtable on engaging objectionable song lyrics in 2018.
- Here is a post I wrote for The Spoke about renaming university buildings currently named after imperialists and slaveholders in 2017.
